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Ⅰ　Introduction
Intelectual property right (hereafter IPR) protection has been an important policy 
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and Japan have strengthened IPRs. Additionaly, since the Agreements on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intelectual Property Rights (TRIPs) has been approved as part 
of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, many developing countries also have 
strengthened their IPR protection. In developed countries, strong IPR policies 
enhance the returns to research and development and increase productivity and long-
run growth rate. In developing countries, strong IPR policies atract foreign 
investment and technology, promoting economic growth.
The above discussion implies that firms that engage in research activity desire 
strong IPR protection. According to the Centre for Responsive Politics (2012), the 
amount of money spent on lobbying in the United States has been increasing from 
2000, and reached $ 3.54 bilion in 2010. In particular, the health-related industry, 
which includes pharmaceutical and medical companies, spends more than $ 524 
milion per year on lobbying activities1). Since we know that these industries 
strongly depend on domestic IPR policies, it is natural that IPR policies are afected 
by political activities such as lobbying or political donations.
Many researchers discuss how IPR policies afect development and economic 
growth. In terms of theoretical studies, Judd (1985) examined how patent length 
afects the market equilibrium path by using an exogenous growth model. However, 
a number of papers have investigated the relationship between IPR policies and 
economic growth after the development of endogenous growth theory by Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howit (1992). In 
particular, Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003), Kwan and Lai 
(2003), and O’Donoghue and Zweimüler (2004) examined the domestic efects of 
IPR policies on economic growth using an endogenous growth framework. In 
general, these studies found that strengthening IPR policies increases productivity 
and the long-run growth rate2). In terms of empirical studies, Gould and Gruben 
(1996) examined the relationship between IPR protection and per capita GDP 
growth for 95 countries in the period 1960-1998 by using an index of IPR protection 
constructed by Rapp and Rozek (1990). Gould and Gruben (1996) find that IPR 
policies afect economic growth significantly and this efect is relatively stronger in 
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open economies.
Further, many researchers also have studied the determinants of IPR policies. In 
particular, Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1972) started a study of optimal patent 
duration. Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) examined optimal 
patent breadth. In general, strengthening IPR policies has two efects on the welfare. 
First of al, by strengthening IPR protection, the government can provide greater 
incentives for innovation, and this wil lead to consumers enjoying beter products. 
This is a marginal benefit of strengthening IPR protection. However, marginal cost 
of strengthening IPR protection is making consumers sufer from monopoly prices 
and dead-weight losses. The optimal patent policy balances the marginal benefits 
with marginal costs.
In a theoretical study, Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) used a variety-expansion 
growth model based on Romer (1990) to show that the optimal patent length that 
maximizes social welfare is finite. Lai and Qiu (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004) 
also developed the North-South trade model to analyze international efects of IPR 
protection, and showed that the governments of developed countries chooses 
stronger IPR protection than those of developing countries. However, these studies 
assumed that the government is non-corupt and maximizes household utility. 
Recently, Eicher and García-Penalõsa (2008) showed how private incentives to 
protect IPR afect economic growth. In particular, they have assumed that the 
private firms themselves protect their IPR and show that multiple equilibria can 
emerge.
In this paper, we construct an endogenous growth model that only incorporates 
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1) The financial sector and communications/electronics sector also spend a lot of money on 
lobbying activities. For details, see the Centre for Responsive Politics (2012).
2) Some studies point out the possibility that strengthening IPR protection discourages economic 
growth. For example, Goh and Olivier (2002) developed a growth model with an upstream 
sector that produces diferentiated inputs and a downstream sector that produces diferentiated 
final goods. They showed that tightening IPR in the downstream sector weakens the incentive 
to innovate and decreases the rate of economic growth through the market size efect.
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innovation as a source of economic growth. Using this model, we consider how 
political donations from firms to the government afect its IPR policy, innovation, 
and welfare. Our model is similar to that of Eicher and García-Penalõsa (2008) in 
that the firms make eforts to protect IPR. However, we assume that the government 
decides its IPR protection taking into account household utility and the amount of 
political donation. This assumption is diferent from that in other literature. In 
general, political donation is regarded as a rent-seeking activity. Many researchers 
have investigated the relationship between rent-seeking activities and economic 
development. One view in the literature is that rent-seeking activities lower the 
growth rate, because they distort the alocation of resources and weaken capital 
accumulation and research activity3). On the other hand, political donation aimed at 
strengthening IPR protection may enhance the incentives for research activity and 
promote economic growth. In this paper, we consider political eforts by firms and 
the importance of political donations in policy-making process.
This paper is organized as folows. In Section 2, we construct the base model 
without political donations. In this seting, we assume that the government chooses 
its IPR protection to maximize household utility. We show that welfare-maximizing 
IPR protection is weaker than growth-maximizing protection. In Section 3, we 
introduce political donations into the base model. In particular, we assume that the 
government pays atention not only to household’s welfare but also to the amount 
of money ofered by the firms. In this seting, we show that the amount of political 
donations distorts optimal patent policy. In Section 4, we provide concluding 
remarks.
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3) For example, based on an empirical analysis, Mauro (1995) finds that rent-seeking activities 
have a negative efect on economic growth. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) argue that 
rent-seeking activities rewards talent more than entrepreneurship does. This implies that rent-
seeking activities discourage economic development.
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Ⅱ　A Simple Model of Innovation and IPR
1. Households
We consider a closed economy with a fixed number of identical households. We 
normalize the total number of households to unity. We assume that each household 
is endowed with L units of labor and supplies its labor inelasticaly. Households 
consume two kinds of goods, homogenous goods and a continuum of diferentiated 
goods. The representative household maximizes lifetime utility over an infinite 
horizon. The lifetime utility Uh is given by:
(1)
where ρ is a discount rate. D(t) is a consumption index of diferentiated goods at 
time t and Y(t) is consumption of homogenous goods. β ∈(0, 1) is a parameter 
which determines the proportion expenditure on diferent goods. Many kinds of 
diferentiated goods exist in this economy and n(t) denotes a measure of 
diferentiated products invented before time t. Each diferentiated good is indexed 
by some real number j∈[0, n(t)]. D(t) is represented by a Dixit and Stiglitz-type 
function:
(2)
where and x(j, t) is consumption of the jth variety of diferentiated product at time t 
and α∈(0, 1) is a parameter which determines the price elasticity of demand.
Under these assumptions, the households’optimization problem can be broken 
down into two stages. In the first stage, the household chooses the optimal time path 
of expenditure in order to maximize (1) subject to the folowing lifetime budget 
constraint:
(3)
where E(t) is instantaneous expenditure, r(t) is the interest rate, w(t) is the wage, 
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T(t) is lump-sum tax, and W(0) is the initial asset holding. In the second stage, the 
household determines how to alocate a given expenditure across diferentiated 
goods and homogenous goods. By solving the second optimization problem, the 
demand functions of diferentiated goods and homogenous good are given by:
(4)
(5)
Next, we return to the first stage of households’optimization. To derive the time 
path of expenditure, we define the ideal price index of D(t) as
(6)
Using this price index, we rewrite the flow of utility as logβ β(1－ β)(1－ β)＋
logE(t)－ βlogPD(t). Therefore, the solution of the above dynamic optimization 
problem is given by the folowing Euler equation:
(7)
2. IPR Policy
In the literatures, there have been some ways to formulate intelectual property 
right in an economic model. For example, various features of intelectual property 
and patent legislation (namely, patent duration, patent breadth, exogenous rate of 
imitation and cost of imitation) are considered and analyzed. In this paper, we 
assume that the government chooses an efort of its enforcement policy, which is 
given by ω ∈[0, 1]. Precisely speaking, ω represents the probability that an 
invented good is protected from competition by the enforcement of a patent. Once a 
patent is enforced by the government, the patent holder can enjoy the exclusive right 
to produce and sel the good. For simplicity, we assume that the lifetime of a patent 
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is infinite if the government decides to enforce a patent. Therefore, diferentiated 
products protected by patents exist in the fraction of ω and those not protected in 
the fraction of 1－ω.
To enforce ω, the government must employ labor. A lump-sum tax colected 
from households is used to employ the labor forces. In particular, we assumeγ ω θ 
units of labor are employed by the government in order to enforce  ω. This 
represents social cost of patent enforcement. Moreover we assume θ ＞1, which 
implies that the marginal social cost of patent enforcement is increasing.
3. Producers
Labor is the only factor of production. We assume that one unit of labor is 
required to produce both diferentiated and homogenous goods. The homogenous 
good is always produced in competitive markets. Since a homogenous good is the 
numeraire, a price of a homogenous good is equal to the unit costs of producing it. 
This implies that w(t) = 1, where w(t) is the wage rate.
Firms in the diferentiated goods sector produce their goods based on designs 
created by R&D activity. Prices of products protected by patents are given as 
pm = 1/α, from the demand (4), because the patent holders have the exclusive rights 
to produce and sel those goods. xm(t) denotes the demand for diferentiated good 
which are protected by patents and π(t) denotes patent profits. Therefore, the profit 
is given as
(8)
On the other hand, a technology for producing a product is immediately imitated if 
a patent is not enforced for the product. Thus, the price of unpatented diferentiated 
goods is pc = 1, because such goods are produced in a competitive market. xc(t) 
denotes demand for an unpatented products. Obviously, unpatented products do not 




In this paper, new designs of diferentiated goods are invented by research and 
development. We let v(t) denote the value of a new design of diferentiated good. 
This is equivalent to the sum of the discounted present value of the expected profits 
from time t. Therefore, we have
(9)
By diferentiating v(t) with respect to t, we derive the no-arbitrage condition as
(10)
Next, we consider the technology of product development. If a firm engaging in 
R&D activity employs Ln(t) units of labor, it can produce n (t) units of new designs ・
of diferentiated goods, according to the folowing knowledge creation function:
(11)
where a represents a parameter which determines the productivity of product 
development. We assume that firms can enter into R&D activity freely. Firms 
finance the costs of product development by issuing equities. Once a firm succeeds 
in developing a new design of a diferentiated product, this design creates a value of 
v(t) when it is protected by a patent. Since ω is the probability that an invented 
good is protected by the enforcement of a patent, the expected value of a new design 
is given by ωv(t). However, a/n(t) units of labor are required to invent a new 
blueprint. Since the free-entry condition requires that the value of patent must not 
exceed the cost of producing it, we obtain
(12)
5. National Income
The final equilibrium condition equates savings with investment. The total 
income of this economy consists of wage from the labor supply and dividends from 
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equities. As mentioned before, the measure of products protected by patents is 
ωn(t). The aggregate income is given as w(t)L ＋ ωn(t)π(t). In this paper we 
assume that the government colects taxes from households in order to enforce its 
patent policy. Therefore, disposable income is w(t)L＋ ωn(t)π(t)－w(t)γ ω θ. 
Saving is given by the diference between disposable income and aggregate 
expenditure, E(t). Moreover, saving finances research investment through the 
financial market. Thus, we derive the equilibrium condition as folows:
(13)
6. The Equilibrium Path
In this section we derive the equilibrium path of the economy. Dividing the both 
sides of (10) by v(t) gives
(14)
Next, we consider the demands of diferentiated goods. Using pc = 1 and pm = 1/α, 
the demand function of diferentiated goods protected by patents is
(15)
Similarly, the demand function of unpatented diferentiated goods is
(16)
By substituting (15) into (8), the profit π(t) is expressed as folows:
(17)
Using this expression, we can rewrite the no-arbitrage condition into (14) as folows:
(18)
Here we define z(t)≡E(t)/(n(t)v(t). By using (7) and (18), the change in z(t) is 




On the other hand, dividing (13) by n(t)v(t) and using w(t) = 1 and (12) yields
(20)
Substituting (20) into (19), we have
(21)
The steady state of the economy is determined so that  z = 0. We let z* denote the ・
value of z(t) in the steady state. Therefore, we can derive z* as folows:
(22)
The phase diagram of this model is shown in Fig.1. We can easily see that the 
unique steady state, z*, is unstable because 1/ω is positive. Since we can interpret 
z(t) as the inverse of total assets measured by utility, z(t) is a variable that can jump. 
Therefore, z(t) jumps to the steady state value z* in this economy. This implies that 
our model has no transitional dynamics and the equilibrium path jumps to the steady 
state instantaneously4).
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Next, we derive the growth rate of n(t) in the steady state, g. Substituting (12) 
into the expression of z* given by (22), we derive E(t) in the steady state. Since we 
can show that the expenditure E(t) is constant and depends on ω, the steady-state 
value of expenditure is expressed as folows:
(23)
Obviously, the expenditure E(ω) is a decreasing function of ω. If the government 
would like to strengthen patent protection, it has to colect more tax. This tax 
colection reduces household’disposable income and expenditure.
Substituting (22) into (20) yields the growth rate of n(t) in the steady state as 
folows:
(24)
We cal g the rate of innovation in the steady state. We are now ready to analyze 
how the strength of IPRs protection afects innovation and welfare. Since the rate of 
innovation g is a function of the efort of patent enforcement ω, we can express 
g = g(ω). Diferentiating g with respect to ω yields
(25)
Let ωg denote the patent protection that maximizes the rate of innovation. From 
(25), ωg must satisfy the folowing relationship.
(26)
Fig. 2 shows the relationship between the rate of innovation and patent protection.
From Fig. 2(a), we find that there is an unique interior solution of ωg when the cost 
of enforcing the patent policy (γandθ) is suficiently large. Moreover, we easily 
find that the growth-maximizing level of patent protection is larger when the 
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4) In other words, the equilibrium path which is not in the steady state cannot satisfy rational 
expectations. For details, see Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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economy has a larger population (L), higher productivity of research activity and 
manufacturing (a) and lower cost of patent protection (γ)5).
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5) On the other hand, the rate of innovation becomes zero when the level of patent protection is 
too weak. We can derive an infimum in which the rate of innovation is positive from (24). 
Here, we focus on the case where the rate of innovation is positive because we are interested 
in an equilibrium path where research and development is conducted.
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7. Government without Political Donation
We now analyze the government policy of patent protection. Here we consider 
the case where the government is non-corupt and maximizes household utility Uh. 
In other words, the government’s objective function W is given by
(27)
For simplicity, we assume that the government sets ω at time 0 and does not change 
this patent policy after time 0.
Next, we derive the household utility as a function of the patent policy. 
Combining D(t) = βE(ω)/PD(t), (6), pc = 1, and pm = 1/α yields
(28)
Substituting (28) and Y (t) = (1 －β)E(ω) into βlogD(t)＋ (1－β)Y (t) yields
(29)
By integrating (29) from 0 to∞with n(t) = n(0)eg (ω) t, we can derive Uh as folows:
(30)
where Λ0 is constant and independent from ω.
Let ωb denote the level of patent protection that maximizes the welfare 
represented by (30). We find the condition that ωb must satisfy by solving 
dW(ω)/dω = 0 as folows:
(31)
The second term of (31) shows that dead weight loss increases with the patent 
protection. The third term implies that the expenditure is a decreasing function of ω 
because more resources are needed to strengthen the patent protection. Obviously, 




Fig. 3 shows the relationship between IPR protection and welfare. When the 
economy is larger (larger L), the cost of enforcing patent protection is smaler 
(smaler γ), and the consumer has a greater preference for diferentiated goods 
(larger β), the welfare-maximizing level of patent protection is higher.
proposition 1 The welfare-maximizing patent protection is weaker than the growth 
maximizing patent protection.
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Ⅲ　The Efects of Political Donation
1. Introducing Political Donation
Next, we consider the possibility of lobbying and political donations. We assume 
that firms which produce diferentiated goods protected by patents engage in 
lobbying activities in order to strengthen their monopolistic power. In particular, 
firms ofer a fraction of their profits to the government as lobbying activities. When 
the government is corupt and wiling to receive money, lobbying activities may 
distort IPR policy.
In this paper, each firm which produces diferentiated goods protected by patents 
gains a constant fraction of profit, φ. Therefore, the firm ofers a fraction (1－ φ) 
of profit to the government. In this case, the market value of a new design of a 
diferentiated good, (9), is modified as
(32)
From (32), it turns out that the value of new design is smaler as compared with the 
case where there is no political donation. By diferentiating v(t) with respect to t, we 
derive the no-arbitrage condition as
(33)
Next, the equilibrium condition of national income, (13) must be changed. In this 
section, we have assumed that a constant fraction of profits is sent to the 
government. Therefore, households receive ω φn(t)π(t) as a dividend and (13) is 
modified as folows:
(34)
Next, we analyze the equilibrium path of the economy. Since we can derive the 
equilibrium path in the same way as in Section 2, we omit the derivation of the 
equilibrium path. As in Section 2, this economy has no transitional dynamics, and 
jumps to the steady state. We can show that the expenditure E(ω) is same as (23). 
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On the other hand, the rate of innovation in the steady state is given by
(35)
Since the rate of innovation g is a function of the efort of patent enforcement ω 
and φ, we can express g = g(ω, φ). Diferentiating g with respect to ω yields
(36)
Similarly, diferentiating g with respect to ω yields
(37)
(36) implies that the growth-maximizing patent protection ωg is the same as the 
case without lobbying. In other words, φ does not afect the growth-maximizing 
patent protection. On the other hand, (37) is positive. When the fraction of political 
donation of profits is smaler, the incentive to engage in research activity becomes 
higher. This efect stimulates innovation in the economy.
2. Government with Political Donation
Next, we examine how the government chooses its patent policy when political 
donation exists. The government decides patent protection considering not only 
household utility but also the gains from political donations. In this section, the 
utility function of the government is given as the average of household utility and 
the sum of the discounted value of political donations.
(38)
whereζis a parameter which determines the extent of government coruption. When
ζis smal, the government values the amount of political donation. We define Ug as 
folows:
(39)
By using (35), the total amount of political donation is expressed as folows:
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(40)
Substituting (40) into (39) and using r(t) = ρon the equilibrium path reveals that Ug 
is simplified as
(41)
(30) and (40) imply that (38) is represented as a function of ω. Let ωd denote the 
level of patent protection that maximizes the welfare represented by (38). We find 
the condition that ωd must satisfy by solving dW(ω)/dω = 0 as folows:
(42)
where Γ（ζ, φ）is defined as
(43)
Using (42) and (43), we can examine how political donation afects patent policy. 
First, we focus on the efect ofζ .ζis a parameter that determines the preference of 
government. A largerζimplies that the government gives much atention to 
household utility. Diferentiating (43) with respect toζyields
(44)
(44) is positive. This shows that whenζis large, the second and third terms of (42) 
becomes large and ωd become smaler (See Fig.4). This implies that if the 
government is not corupt and pays much atention to household utility, it chooses 
weaker patent protection. On the other hand, a corupt government chooses higher 
patent protection. In particular, we can show that for any φ, Γ（0, φ）= 0. This 
implies that the second and third terms of (42) vanish and (42) coresponds to (26). 
Intuitively, when the government is corupt and pays much atention to political 
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donations, it tends to have too much incentive to strengthen patent protection in 
order to receive a lot of money from firms. Therefore, we obtain the folowing 
proposition.
Next, we examine the efect of φ. The parameter φ represents the fraction of 
profits that is paid as political donations. A larger φ implies that firms make eforts 
to ofer a lot of money to the government. Diferentiating (43) with respect to φ 
yields
(45)
Therefore, the sign of (45) depends on the relationship betweenζandζ*, defined as
(46)
This shows that ∂ Γ（ζ, φ）/∂ φ< 0 if ζ > ζ*. In this case, an increase in φ reduces 
proposition 2 If the government is corrupt and pays much atention to political 
donations, the government strengthens patent protection and increases innovation.
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the second and third terms of (42), and the government chooses higher patent 
protection (See Fig. 5). On the other hand, ∂ Γ（ζ, φ）/∂ φ> 0 if ζ< ζ*. In this 
case, an increase in φ increases the second and third terms of (42), and the 
government chooses weaker patent protection (See Fig. 6). Intuitively, we can find 
two efects when φ increases. Firstly, when φ is higher, an increase in ω raises 
the rate of innovation g(ω) more sharply. The higher rate of innovation increases 
household utility and political donation. In other words, an increase in φ raises the 
marginal benefit of strengthening patent protection. Secondly, an increase in φ 
directly reduces the amount of political donation. This efect decreases the marginal 
benefit of strengthening patent protection. When ζ > ζ*, the first efect dominates 
and the marginal benefit of strengthening patent protection increases because the 
non-corupt government considers the household utility seriously. This implies that 
whenζ ＞ ζ*, an decrease in φ, which coresponds to higher profit fraction 
alocated to political donation, only discourages innovation and the government 
chooses weaker patent protection. On the other hand, when ζ ＜ ζ*, the second 
efect dominates, and the marginal benefit of strengthening patent protection 
decreases because the government pays much atention to political donations. As a 
consequence, this implies that when ζ ＜ ζ*, an decrease in φ raises the amount 
of political donation and a corupt government chooses stronger patent protection. 
Hence, we derive the folowing proposition.
proposition 3 If the government is non-corrupt and pays much atention to house 
hold utility (ζ ＞ ζ*), a higher fraction of political donations discou rages 
innovation and the government chooses weaker patent protection. On the other 
hand, If the government is corrupt and pays much atention to political donation 
(ζ ＜ ζ*), a higher fraction of political donations encourages innovation and the 
government chooses stronger patent protection.
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Ⅳ　Concluding Remarks
Using an endogenous growth model that only incorporates innovation as a source 
of economic growth, this paper has examined how political donations from firms to 
the government afect its IPR policy, innovation, and welfare. Firstly, as a 
benchmark, we have assumed that the government is non-corupt and pays atention 
only to household utility and that there are no political donations. In this model, we 
have shown that welfare-maximizing patent protection is weaker than growth-
maximizing protection because strengthening patent protection damages households 
by increasing dead weight loss and decreasing expenditure level.
Next, we have considered the case of political donations. In this case, when the 
government is corupt and pays much atention to political donations, it tends to 
have too much of an incentive to strengthen patent protection in order to receive a 
lot of money from the firms. Therefore, the government strengthens patent 
protection and increases innovation. This explains the patent policies tend to be 
strengthened in countries where political donation is important for politicians, such 
as in the United States.
On the other hand, we have observed two diferent efects when the fraction of 
profits alocated to political donations is higher. When the government is noncorupt 
and pays much atention to household utility, a higher fraction of profits alocated to 
political donations discourages innovation and the government chooses weaker 
patent protection. This is because a higher fraction of profits alocated to political 
donations weakens the incentive to engage in research and development. As a 
consequence, this efect decreases the marginal benefit of strengthening patent 
protection. On the other hand, when the government is corupt and pays much 
atention to political donations, a higher fraction of profits alocated to political 
donations encourages innovation and the government chooses stronger patent 
protection. This is because a higher fraction of profits alocated to political 
donations raises the amount of political donation. This efect enhances the marginal 
benefit of strengthening patent protection. In particular, the later result is interesting 
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because a higher fraction of political donation leads to a strong IPR policy and a 
higher rate of economic growth in countries where political donation is important 
for politicians. However, IPR policy in this case may be too high when we consider 
the household utility. In other words, when political donation is important for 
policymaking, the government tends to have an incentive to choose an excessive 
level of patent protection.
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